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Abstract. The new watermarking technique1 presented in this paper
is an example of an asymmetric public detection scheme. The detection
process does not need the original picture nor the secret key used in the
embedding process. It is the translation, in the watermarking domain, of
a public key pair cryptosystem. The key idea is to filter the pseudo-noise
sequence before embedding it in the cover-content. Contrary to classi-
cal techniques, the heart of the detection algorithm is not a correlation
measure but a consistent statistical test hypothesis in spectral analysis.
Some signal based considerations show that knowing the public key used
in the detection process is no use for pirate who wants to discover the se-
cret key. An example of a copyright protection system for digital content
using this technique is briefly described.
1 Introduction
Watermarking is the art of embedding information in a cover-content in a robust
and non-perceptible way. Therefore, the quality of a watermarking technique
can be expressed in terms of capacity, non-perceptibility and robustness. An-
other distinction is whether the technique supports private watermark, where
the original cover-content is needed to extract hidden information, or public
watermark, where one can detect the embedded message without the original
content. The terminology of public watermarking was set by B. Pfitzmann [1]
during the first international Workshop on Information Hiding and is depicted
in Fig. 1. It clearly appears that the embedding and detection processes have a
common parameter called the key. Thus, comparing to a cryptography system,
current watermarking techniques are symmetric schemes [12]. The key parameter
is usually called the secret key in reference to Kerckhoffs cryptographic principle
[14]: A cryptographic algorithm can not remain secret, hence the security of a
cryptosystem must only rely on the key kept in a safe place. A really important
constraint is intrinsic to the symmetry of these schemes. Every entity able to
1 French patent application number 99-07139 filled on the first of June 1999
2detect a watermark shares the same secret key as the watermarker and thus can
erase it or change the embedded message. The watermarker has to give his secret
key in a secure way only to trusted entities. This constraint restricts drastically
the use of watermarking technique in many domains. It is well known that no
secret can be stored in consumer electronic devices or software. Smart-cards,
which are considered to be the only secure equipment in consumer electronic
domain, are not powerful enough or too expensive to support a complete water-
mark detection process. Indeed, it seems that the only way to use watermark in
secure way is the case where a content owner proves its ownership detecting his
watermark in the presence of a lawyer in order not to reveal his secret key in
public audiences.
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Fig. 1. Usual watermarking scheme and terminology
This major drawback has been solved in cryptography thanks to asymmet-
ric schemes: encryption and decryption processes do not use the same key. The
global system is based on a public keys pair where the private key, for example
in case of certificate signature, is used in the encryption process and the public
key in the decryption process. Obviously, the public key depends on the private
key although it is impossible to deduce the private key from it. Transposing this
idea in the watermarking domain would mean that the embedding and detec-
tion processes do not share a common secret. Moreover, knowing the detection
algorithm and all its parameters is not enough to deduce the secret parameter
used in the embedding process and besides it does not bring any clue in order to
remove the watermark from the stego-content. F. Hartung has already presented
a kind of public key watermarking technique based on classical spread spectrum
watermaking scheme [19]. But it does not achieve all the desired specifications.
Especially, a pirate can remove a part of the watermark. Whereas there is enough
watermark signal left to allow the owner to retrieve it thanks to his private key,
a detector with the public key can no more detect it.
This paper introduces a new watermark technique that is asymmetric and
indeed completely different from classical spread spectrum technique. Follow-
ing the reasoning of the authors, this paper firstly focuses on the cryptographic
RSA scheme in order to derive some useful comparisons with the signal pro-
cessing domain. To be more precise, this leads to the well known issue of blind
3equalization in the digital communication domain. Thanks to these comparisons,
an asymmetric watermarking technique is then built up and tested with classi-
cal simulations. Finally, the use of these asymmetric watermarking technique is
discussed.
2 From Cryptography to Signal Processing
Cryptography and watermarking are obviously linked, at least because water-
marking, contrary to steganography, has to be robust and secure. But it is ex-
tremely hard to mix in a fruitful way these two scientific domains: Cryptography
is based on number theory whereas watermarking tackles real signals. Usually,
cryptography and watermarking are used separately, one after the other. The
message to be hidden is encrypted before being embedded in the cover-content,
or the stego-content is encrypted after the watermark embedding. But these
combinations of cryptographic and watermarking techniques do not obviously
improve the security or the functionalities of the global system. For example,
imagine that one encrypts the message with an asymmetric cryptographic ci-
pher like RSA, before embedding it in the cover-content with a classical spread
spectrum technique, in order to build an asymmetric watermarking scheme. It
is true that the only person able to embed a message is the RSA and watermark
private keys holder. But, a pirate, knowing the detection process because he
hacked a software or did the reverse engineering of a consumer electronic device
or transformed the stego-content by an efficient attack like Stirmark [13], can
erase the watermark whatever the security level of the cryptosystem used. This
example is clearly not a good design of asymmetric watermarking technique. In
most cases, the weakest link in a security point of view and the most constraining
function is the watermark detection. That is the reason why it is necessary to
invent a completely different watermarking technique truly asymmetric, getting
inspired by the cryptography domain.
2.1 Example of RSA Cryptosystem
The RSA cryptosystem, invented by R. Rivest, A. Shamir and L. Adleman, is one
of the most famous asymmetric schemes. This section gives a short description
of the RSA encryption scheme. Key generation is done as follows: choose two
large prime numbers p and q, compute n = pq and Ψ (n) = (p − 1)(q − 1)
where Ψ is the Euler’s function, select a random integer e prime with Ψ (n) and
compute the only one integer d such that ed = 1 mod Ψ (n). (n, e) is the public
key whereas d is the private key. As watermarking is similar to signature in
concept, the encryption with the private key is detailed: represent the message
as an integer m, compute c = md mod n, c is then the encrypted message.
Decryption is easy and based on Fermat’s theorem: use the public key (n, e) to
compute m = ce mod n. See [2] or [14] for further details.
The security of RSA relies on the difficulty of computing the private key
d knowing the public key (n, e). The problem stems from factoring n in prime
4numbers: because the pirate can not find (p, q) from n (no efficient algorithm
known up to now) he cannot compute Ψ (n) nor d, which is the private key. Hence,
it seems (it has not yet been proven that breaking RSA is equivalent to factoring)
that the security of the system is based on the fact that (p, q) −→ n = pq is a
one way operation.
2.2 One Way Operation in Signal Processing
Compared to RSA algorithm, an asymmetric watermarking technique should
add a watermark in the content using a one way operation in order to prevent
pirate from removing it (operation equivalent to (p, q) −→ n = pq), but with the
property that the detector can still retrieve the watermark (property equivalent
to Fermat’s theorem). It means that the detector should notice the effect of the
watermark without having the knowledge of the cause. A solution was found in
the digital communication field. In this domain, signals transmitted are modi-
fied by the communication channel. The channel is usually considered as a linear
time-invariant (LTI) filter. The receiver has to invert the effect of the channel.
This is the role of the equalizer. For this purpose, the transmitter begins to send
a reference sequence known by the receiver in order to initially adjust the coeffi-
cients of the equalizer. Then, when the really informative signal is transmitted,
the receiver is able to compensate the channel effect. As transmitting the ref-
erenced sequence takes time and power, communication system are desired not
to need such training period. This is the problem of blind equalization based on
initial adjustment of the coefficients without the benefit of a training sequence.
But these methods are less efficient than classical ones especially at low signal to
noise power ratio. A one way operation can be found every time blind equaliza-
tion is not possible. This asymmetric technique is based on the main idea that
passing through a filter, whatever white noise will produce a sequence noticeable
by the shape of its power spectrum density (psd). But, with some assumptions
explained in the next section, it is impossible to retrieve the original sequence.
Hence, while the detection only consists of checking the psd of the watermark,
a pirate can not estimate and remove the watermark. This referenced psd is the
public key, whereas the private key is the set of the white noise sequence and
the filter coefficients.
A Signal Processing Theorem. Second-order statistics like auto-correlation
and density spectrum function of the output signal of a LTI filter provide infor-
mation only on the magnitude of the filter characteristics (except for periodic
signals). This statement can be done regarding the following theorem:
Consider a discrete LTI filter which impulse response h = {hn} is real and
frequency response is noted H(f). Its input signal is noted v = {vn}, issued from
a stationary random process, and its output w = {wn}. The following equations
5(1) can be written:
φww[k] =
∞∑
m=−∞
φvv[k−m]
∞∑
u=−∞
huhu+m and Φww(f) = |H(f)|2 · Φvv(f)
(1)
where φww[k] is the auto-correlation discrete function of w and Φww(f) its power
spectrum density. Observing Φww(f), there is, a priori, no way to estimate H(f)
(or equivalently h) due to the phase non-determination [3]. A known exception
are minimum (or maximum) phase filter, because the phase of H(f) is related
to its magnitude.
Blind Deconvolution. Blind equalization techniques manage however to es-
timate filter coefficients. In the case of SISO (Single Input Single Output) sys-
tem, there are mainly three classes of blind equalization algorithms based on
maximum likelihood criterion, stochastic gradient iteration or high order signal
statistics [3]. These techniques do not work if the broadcast signal is a gaussian
white noise [18]. All the information concerning this random process are given by
second-order statistics, which, according to the signal processing theorem above,
bring only information on the magnitude of the filter process. But in the SIMO
case (Single Input Multiple Outputs), an algorithm derived from the subspace
method for example, is able to estimate the impulse responses of the different
filters. These estimations feed a classical equalizer which retrieve the input of
the SIMO bank of filters. In the watermarking technique described hereafter,
the SISO case is mandatory to prevent the pirate from estimating the filter and
retrieving the secret sequence. Thus, only one filter is used in the embedding
process.
Hence, in the SISO case, if sequence v is issued from a gaussian stationary
random process and h is not the impulse response of a minimum or maximum
phase filter, (v,h) −→ h⊗ v is a signal processing one way operation (⊗ is the
convolution product).
3 Asymmetric Watermarking Technique
3.1 Embedding Process
Let the sequence x = {xn} of length N represent the content (luminance of
pixels [4], DCT coefficients [6], Fourier-Mellin transform coefficients [5], wavelet
transform coefficients for still picture, location of grid nodes of computer image,
facial animation parameters of MPEG-4 head object, sample of sound [15]...).
Assume there is an algorithm based on some Human Perception Model con-
siderations which is able to calculate the amount of noise that each coefficient
can bear without perceptible quality loss. Its output is the HPM modulation
sequence noted p = {pn} with pn ≥ 0 ∀n ∈ [1..N ].
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Fig. 2. Design of the embedding process
An interleaver is used in this embedding process. Its role is to mix the se-
quence x as a random permutation pi. Output sequences are noted with the
symbol ˜. Hence, x˜n = xpi(n) ∀n ∈ [1..N ].
According to Fig. 2, embedding process leads to the equation (2).
yn = xn + pn.(h⊗ v)pi−1(n) ∀n ∈ [1..N ] (2)
with v white noise distributed as N (0, σv). Assuming that x, p and v are sta-
tistically independent sequences, equations (3) hold:
φ  y  y[k] = E[y˜ny˜n−k] = E[(x˜n + p˜n.(h⊗ v)n).(x˜n−k + p˜n−k.(h⊗ v)n−k)]
φ  y
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x
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huhmvn−uvn−k−m]
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 
y[k] = φ
 
x
 
x[k] + φ
 
p
 
p[k].σ
2
v.(h⊗ h)k (3)
where E is the statistical expectation, σ2v is the variance of the sequence v.
Assuming the interleaver is perfect, that is to say its output sequences are white
and stationary, then simplifications leads to:
7φ y y[k] = µ
2
x + (σ
2
x + σ
2
p.σ
2
v.
∑
u
h2u).δ[k] + µ
2
p.σ
2
v.(h⊗ h)k (4)
and
Φ y y(f) = µ
2
x.δ(f) + (σ
2
x + σ
2
p.σ
2
v.
∑
u
h2u) + µ
2
p.σ
2
v. |H(f)|2 (5)
The secret key in the embedding process is the set of sequences h and v.
3.2 Detection Process
The detection process is based on spectral analysis. Let the sequence r = {rn}
of length N represent the received content. The goal is to test two hypothesis:
– G0: the received content is not watermarked so the power spectral density
of the interleaved received sequence r˜ is flat. The estimated psd is expressed
as g0(f) = σ
2
r + µ
2
r.δ(f) ∀f ∈]− 12 , 12 ].
– G1: the received content is watermarked so the power spectral density of the
interleaved received sequence r˜ is estimated as
g1(f) = µ
2
x.δ(f) + µ
2
p.σ
2
v. |H(f)|2 + C ∀f ∈]− 12 , 12 ]
such that C = σ2r −
∫ 1
2
− 12
µ2p.σ
2
v. |H(f)|2 .df − µ2x according to (5).
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Fig. 3. Design of the detection process
In [9], a test defined by the critical region expressed in (6) is proved to be
asymptotically equivalent to the likelihood ratio test.
{r˜ | 2.N.[UN,0(r˜)− UN,1(r˜)] > d(Pfa)} (6)
where d(Pfa) is a threshold depending on a desired false alarm probability and
UN,i is the significant quantity related to the hypothesis Gi of the principal part
8of the log likelihood. If the estimated power spectral density is strictly positive,
then UN,i expression is simply (7).
UN,i(r˜) =
∫ 1
2
− 12
(log gi(f) +
IN (f)
gi(f)
)df i ∈ {0, 1} (7)
where IN (f)=
1
N
∣∣∣∑Nk=1 r˜k. exp(2pijfk)∣∣∣2 is the periodogram of the interleaved
received sequence r˜, following a χ2 distribution with two degrees of freedom
[10].
The public key in the detection process is |H(f)|.
3.3 Security Point of View
Classical Spread Spectrum Technique. Keeping the same notation, classical
spread spectrum technique can be sum up with the equation (8).
yn = xn + pn.vn ∀n ∈ [1..N ] (8)
Detection is done via a correlation: a content is declared watermarked if the
correlation with the referenced sequence is superior to a fixed positive threshold.
〈y|v〉 = 〈x|v〉+ 〈p.v|v〉 > d′(Pfa) (9)
where 〈y|v〉 = ∑n ynvn. The aim of a pirate is to create from a watermarked
content a cleared content no more detectable. This can be easily done knowing
the sequence v which is the secret key of this scheme:
y′ = y−〈y|v〉〈v|v〉 .v (10)
The resulting sequence y′ is not equal to the original one x due to the HPM
modulation sequence p. However, if the quality of the resulting content is correct,
the pirate achieved his goal. It clearly highlights the importance of the safety
of the secret key. If this scheme is designed to be used widely, such detector
can not be implemented in non-secure electronic component. But, ‘stealing’ the
secret key is not the only way to achieve pirate’s aim. One can try to estimate
the sequence v via an average process of T different watermarked contents via
formula (11).
v̂ =
1
T
T∑
k=1
yk =
1
T
T∑
k=1x
xk + (
1
T
T∑
k=1
pk).v ≈α.v (11)
The only solution to avoid this attack is to desynchronise the embedded pseudo-
noise sequence v: yn,k = xn,k + pn,k.vn−tk ∀n ∈ [1..N ]. But then, the detector
has to get resynchronised. It means that it has to find the delay tk for a given
9content rk, calculating as many correlation as the number of possible delays. Ton
Kalker and al [11] give a very efficient and nice implementation of this method.
Nethertheless, I.J. Cox and J.P. Linnartz pointed out a more powerful attack.
Assuming the pirate has a detector device he can use as many times he likes
(which is the case in consumer electronic), he can finally manage to create a
cleared content y′ using the detector O(N ) times. This security flaw is due to
the linearity of the correlation. See [12] for further details.
Asymmetric Technique. Thanks to the design of the asymmetric watermark-
ing technique above, these threats hold no more. Obviously, the sequence v is
stored nowhere in the detection process so nobody can steal it. This sequence
is different for each content, so the average attack is useless. And finally, the
detection algorithm is not linear which makes the attack of [12] non valid.
Although this watermarking technique has, for the moment, only one bit
of capacity, a copy protection system for digital contents can be based on it.
The idea is, as usual, to add a header to each copyrighted content. This header
contains important data related to the content (identification number, rights
granted to the user...) and will be bound to the content via a cryptographic
signature. This is usually called a certificate. Pirate can not modify a copyrighted
content or its certificate because the digital signature is then no more valid.
But, he can remove the certificate, pretending the hacked content is a personal
creation or whatever not copyrighted. That is the reason why copyrighted content
are watermarked with an asymmetric technique. The role of this watermark is
to warn the device that the content it deals with, is copyrighted. This device will
read data in the certificate and will check its signature. If the signature is non
valid or if no certificate is present whereas the content is watermarked, the device
refuses to deal with this content. Notice that the device has no secret key but
two public keys: one for the cryptosystem verifying signature, another for the
watermark asymmetric detector. The content’s owner has two secret keys: one
for the cryptosystem making signature, another for the watermark embedding
process.
A restriction may appear in the use of this watermarking technique. The
comparison with asymmetric cryptosystems is not completely fulfilled. Knowing
the public key |H(f)|, everybody can build its own private key (h′, v′) provided
that |H ′(f)| = |H(f)| ∀f ∈] − 12 , 12 ]. As a watermark usually induces a re-
striction of user’s rights like in the copy protection system described above, this
fact is not really a dead end. Notice that the owner can still prove its ownership
detecting his watermark, via a classical correlation detector, in the presence of
a lawyer in order not to reveal his secret key (h, v) in public audiences.
4 Simulation
The goal of these simulations is to prove the validity of this new concept. Details
of implementation are first given. A small panel of 512 × 512 pixels pictures is
used (Lena, peppers and mandrill). Only the luminance data coded in 256 grey
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levels are watermarked. xn is the luminance of the pixel located in (i, j) such
that n = i+ (j − 1).512.
4.1 Interleaver
Two interleavers are used. The direct interleaver tidies luminance pixels in a row
of length 5122 and mixes it according to a random given permutation vector. The
inverse interleaver will apply the inverse permutation and will tidy the resulting
row in a 512× 512 pixels picture. The random permutation vector is calculated
with the Moses and Oakford algorithm [17].
4.2 Human Visual System Modulation Sequence
A basic algorithm is used to calculate the modulation sequence p. The image X
is filtered with a laplacian high-pass filter. The absolute value of this result is
tidied in a sequence p.
pi+(j−1).512 = |λ ⊗X|i,j λ =
−1 −1 −1−1 +8 −1
−1 −1 −1
 /9 (12)
Textured regions or edges lead to high coefficients whereas uniform regions
lead to very low values. This follows very roughly the eye’s behavior, but no
precise theoretical model sustains this choice. This algorithm is very fast and
experimental results are satisfactory as noted in [11].
4.3 Role of the Length of Sequences
To embed the watermark, two strategies can be chosen. Add a filtered pseudo-
random sequence w as long as the sequence x˜, or use a shorter pseudo-random
sequence that one repeats several times before adding it to the sequence x˜.
This last choice is usually made in classical spread spectrum technique [11];
to detect the watermark, the received sequence r˜ is then averaged. Hence, the
watermark to cover-content power ratio is increased leading to a better false
alarm probability. But, this ‘tiling’ process is also interesting for a pirate using
the average attack. With the asymmetric watermarking scheme described before,
the two strategies are illustrated. Nseq is the number of time the filtered pseudo-
random sequence is repeated. Thus, Nseq ∗N = 5122. Original and watermarked
pictures are given to the detector. The result is the quantity 2.N.[UN,0(r˜) −
UN,1(r˜)]. The sign of this quantity figures out if the content is watermarked
(positive) or not (negative), whereas its absolute value shows how reliable is the
decision. It means that the threshold d(Pfa) is set to zero. Figure 4 plots the
average of these quantities calculated for the three different pictures and for 30
different pseudo-random sequences. On the abscissa is the parameter Nseq. It
appears that high reliability occurs when embedding long sequences rather than
short ones tiled several times, thanks to the consistence of the test hypothesis
designed. The conclusion of this simulation is to set the parameter Nseq to one,
which means that the sequence w is not repeated.
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4.4 JPEG Test
The three pictures watermarked with the parameter Nseq set to 1, are then com-
pressed with the JPEG algorithm with a quality factor Q. Figure 5 plots the
average of the resulting quantities 2.N.[UN,0(r˜)−UN,1(r˜)]. For quality factors Q
higher than 10, the results are far bigger than the one computed with the origi-
nal image. But, as the results are indeed compared to d(Pfa), the watermark is
only robust to Q = 70 JPEG compression. This is not a good robustness com-
pared to actual watermarking techniques. Indeed, it can be compared to the first
watermarking techniques presented a few years ago. But, authors believe a far
better robustness can be reached if DCT or DWT coefficients are watermarked
instead of pixels’ value. In the same way, Fourrier-Mellin transformation might
be useful to derive an asymmetric watermarking technique robust to rotation,
scaling and translation processes. The simualtion shows that the basic concept of
the watermarking technique is valuable and allows us to foresee a fair robustness
using clever transformations like DCT or DWT coefficients.
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5 Conclusion
This article is a description of the concept of the first truly asymmetric wa-
termarking technique. The main advantage is that no secret is stored in the
detector. Hence, the owner of copyrighted content must not rely on the security
of the detection device. Thanks to the consistence of the detector, this technique
is absolutely robust against average attack. The simulations show that this con-
cept is valuable and may solve the open issue left in [16] about ‘public key
steganography against an active warden’. There are several technical problems
left which need to be solved: some are related to the concept itself (large size of
the public key, synchronization, increase of capacity, domain of application re-
stricted...), others are related to the implementation of it (which transformation
has to be used in order to achieve better robustness against scaling, rotation and
compression - Can this concept be used for sound samples?).
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